Robotization and Welfare Trends in Future by Kencebay, Belma
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books










There are concerns over the present and possible future impact of new 
advancements like robots and artificial intelligence on welfare. Experts from dif-
ferent fields including science and business have been concentrating on how new 
developments may affect the job market, and more broadly how new advance-
ments will influence the society. It would be easy to get support for the use of 
robots for the tasks which are too difficult or too dangerous for humans. What is 
the capital owners’ focus at that point? What are the economic and social conse-
quences of robotization? In this chapter, literature review including the recent 
thoughts on how developments in robotics may cause major changes in welfare 
distribution and revolutionary economic changes is presented.
Keywords: robots, personal economy, robotics, economic effect of robotics, welfare 
trends, unconditional basic income (UBI) , guaranteed minimum income (GMI), 
industry 4.0, skill premia, skill-biased technical change (SBTC), polarization
1. Introduction
The new World Robotics report indicates that more than 2.4 million robots are 
working in manufacturing lines. The robot sales amount is around 16.5 billion USD. 
As indicated by The International Federation of Robotics (IFR) public statement on 
Feb 19, 2020 from 2020 to 2022 right around 2 million new units of robots are relied 
upon to be introduced in industrial facilities around the globe [1].
Robotics technology developed majorly from 1990 to 2000s, especially with 
an increase in the number of industrial robots in the United States and Western 
Europe from 1993 to 2007. In the United States, the rise numbered to one new robot 
per 1000 workers, and in Western Europe to 1.6 new robots per 1000 workers. The 
automotive industry utilizes the major part of it by 38% of existing robots, then 
the electronics industry follows it by 15% and the plastics and chemicals industry 
follows it by 10% and lastly metal products industry by 7%. Acemoglu theoretically 
found that robots can decrease employment and wages and that their local effects 
can be evaluated utilizing variety in exposure to robots—defined from industry-
level advances in robotics and local industry employment. It is assessed that the 
relevant field most threatened by robots after 1990 does not exhibit any differential 
trends before then, and robots’ effect is separated from other capital and technolo-
gies. One more robot per 1000 workers decreases the employment-to-population 
ratio by 0.2% and wages by 0.42% [2].
The 47% of laborers in USA will be exposed to risk of losing their employ-
ment as indicated by Frey and Osborne [3] study including characterization of 
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702 occupations dependent on its degree of lack of protection against automation. 
Other supporting report has been published by the World Bank assesses that 57% 
of professions in the OECD could be robotized all through the upcoming two 
decades [4, 5].
Frey and Osborne [3] foresees a shortening of the current trend toward labor 
market polarization; computerization is mainly related to low skills and low paid 
professions. Their findings imply that, as technology advances, low experienced 
labors will redistribute assignments that are not delicate to computerization. Frey 
and Osborne [3] divide between high, medium, and low risk professions based on 
the possibility of computerization. According to the study, about 47% of total US 
employment is in the high risk category [6].
Expanding on the evaluation performed by Frey et al., other investigation 
assesses the effect of robotization for the OECD including 32 nations that have 
partaken in the survey of adult skills. It infers that 14% of occupations in OECD 
would be profoundly controlled by automation (i.e., likelihood of computerization 
of over 70%). More than 66 million employees from 32 different countries included 
in Frey’s study. According to the study, another 32% of occupations have a danger 
of somewhere in the range of 50–70% highlighting the chance of huge change in the 
manner these jobs are fulfilled due to robotization. For example, a critical portion 
of errands, yet not all, could be robotized, changing the expertise prerequisites for 
the employments [7–9].
We may see the development of new instruction programs, especially an 
expansion in computer generated reality gaming-based training and particularly 
in coding. Be that as it may, this will be tempered by the rise of AI/apply autonomy 
moving into the information segment, which can possibly prompt the disappearing 
of expert class, non-administrative desk occupations. Simultaneously, mechanical 
autonomy will move forcefully into sensor-based, world-route occupations like 
transportation. We may require a crucial reshaping of our economy and may not 
give educating/training individuals for occupations that are just not going to be 
there. And also recent studies found that high levels of anxiety about robotization 
and automation indicate the broad concerns about their outcomes [7].
It turns out a considerable amount of vulnerability and contention remains. In 
this chapter, the recent thoughts on how AI and robotics may cause major changes 
in welfare distribution and revolutionary employment changes will be summarized 
by a literature review.
2. Literature review
In the study, we will look at two main topics, the first is literature about 
robotization and its effect on employment and the second is possible future 
welfare distribution models.
2.1 Robotization and unemployment
In this area, the academics are divided into two poles, one pole assumes that 
the firm-level adoption of robots causes a decrease in labor shares, rises in added 
value and productivity, and reduces the share of production workers. Especially 
in industrial sectors which are specialized in routine activities are more likely to 
face substantial decreases in the labor share. Some of the studies theorize that new 
changes in automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI) might pave the way 
for broad unemployment. All types of occupations from lawyers to truck drivers 
will be permanently tumbled. Companies will be forced to change or expire. The 
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latest economic signals also reflect this trend; less people are employed, and wages 
are declining even as productiveness and earnings rise. The list below includes the 
academicians whose articles associated the robotization and automation to increase 
in unemployment.
As can be seen above, the dimensions that are studied related with robotiza-
tion and employment, is listed as skill-biased technical change, polarization, wage 
inequality, and skill premia. Skill premia can be described as the relative wage of 
high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers and according to Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee [18, 32], it has risen over most of the second half of the last century, despite 
large increases in the supply of high-skilled workers. Acemoglu [10] developed a 
Robotization effects on employment
Studies Dimensions/ideas
Acemoglu [10] Skill premia/skill-biased technical change (SBTC)
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Acemoglu and Restrepo [11] The displacement effect
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2] Robotization/unemployment
Acemoglu et al. [12] Robotization/unemployment
Autor and Dorn [13] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Autor et al. [14] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Autor [15] Polarization
Autor et al. [16] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Autor et al. [14] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Berman et al. [17] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Brynjolfsson and McAfee [18] Robotization/unemployment/structural changes
Brynjolfsson et al.[10] The “capital deeping” with robotization
Dao et al. [19] SBTC/routinized job industry based
Frey and Osborne [3] Robotization/unemployment
Goos and Manning [20] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Goos et al. [21] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Graetz and Michaels [22] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Gregg and Manning [23] Wage inequality/SBTC
Huang and Rust [24] Artificial intelligence (AI)/unemployment
Krusell et al. [25] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Goos et al. [21] Polarization
Michaels et al. [26] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Nedelkoska and Quintini [9] Robotization/unemployment
Sachs and Kotlikoff [27]; Benzel et al. [28] SBTC/polarization/ICT
Sachs and Kotlikoff [27]; Benzell et al. [28] Robotization/unemployment/structural changes
Sachs et al. [9] Robotization/unemployment
Susskind and Susskind [29] Robotization/unemployment
Van Reenen [30] Wage inequality/SBTC/polarization
Wolter et al. [31] 5-step scenario transformation to Industry 4.0
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model to explore how skill premia changes by time and between countries and how 
it work on this framework to see the effect of foreign commerce on wage inequality. 
Skill premia is regulated by technology and the supply of skills. Skill-biased technical 
change (SBTC) can be described as a transfer in the manufacturing technology that 
prefer competent over incompetent employees by increasing its relative productivity 
and, therefore, its relative demand. In the literature, SBTC has been studied for 
several years in that the productivity of more competent workers has risen more 
faster than that of incompetent workers. This SBTC has been getting quite high 
recognition due to its relation with increasing wage inequality. Gregg and Manning 
[23] concluded that when workers are paid according to their productiveness, 
alteration in productivity reflects revision in wages, and the labor market position 
of the incompetent workers will continue to fall apart and disappear. Goos et al. [21] 
studied the job polarization (JP) within-industry and between-industry compo-
nents empirically and concluded that the employment design in Western Europe has 
been polarizing with increasing employment proportions for well-paid occupations 
and supervisors and also flat-salaried service employees and increasing unemploy-
ment shares of manufacturing and routine office employees. The JP is a kind of 
technological change, favoring toward exchanging employees who are doing routine 
tasks and then the tasks are offshored and both polarization and offshoring create 
a decline in the demand for average-skilled workers relative to competent workers 
and incompetent occupations.
Acemoglu [2] contemplated a few sources including a survey by the Ministry 
of Industry, information provided by French robot suppliers in addition to list of 
clients, customs data on imports of industrial robots by firm, and the French fiscal 
files and developed theoretical expectations about adoption of robots for French 
assembling companies and examine the level ramifications of robot usage. Out of 
55,390 firms in their study, 598 have received robots somewhere in the range of 
2010 and 2015. Their study indicated that how companies alter their manufacturing 
system, recruitment, work force portions, and productiveness as they embrace 
automation technologies that can help us to better understand the wide-ranging 
effects of automation. Nevertheless, company-level effects do not correspond to the 
overall impact of automation because firms that adopt such technologies decline the 
costs and broaden at the expense of competitors. Acemoglu [2] predicts that French 
manufacturing firms that embrace robots not only decrease their work force por-
tion and percentage of manufacturing laborer and rise their productivity but also 
expand their operations and employment. Yet, this is more than offset by significant 
declines in their competitors’ employment. Generally speaking, despite the fact that 
organizations receiving robots extend their work, the market-level ramifications of 
robot appropriation are not positive. They also declare that robot acceptance com-
mits to the decrease in the production work force portion by decreasing the covari-
ance between firm-level value added and labor share, and this is because adopters 
are large and enlarge further as they observe sizable relative decreases in their work 
force portions. The 20% rise in robot adopting is resulted with a 3.2% increase in 
industry unemployment [12].
Acemoglu and Restrepo started a framework published in 2019, according to 
the heart of their framework is the fundamental thought that computerization and 
along these lines AI and mechanical technology supplant laborers in undertakings 
that they recently performed, and by means of this channel, make an incredible 
“The displacement effect.” As opposed to assumptions in a lot of macroeconomics 
and financial matters, which keep up that profitability upgrading innovations con-
sistently increment in general work request, the relocation impact can diminish the 
interest for work, wages, and business. In addition, the “displacement effect” infers 
that increments in yield per specialist emerging from robotization will not bring 
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about a relative development of the interest for work. The removal effect causes a 
decoupling of wages and yield per laborer and a decrease in the portion of work in 
national salary.
Acemoglu et al. [12] at that point feature a few countervailing powers that push 
against the uprooting impact and may infer that computerization, AI, and apply 
autonomy could build labor demand. First, the replacement of modest machines for 
human work makes an “efficiency impact”: as the expense of delivering mechanized 
assignments decays, the economy will grow and expand the interest for work in 
nonautomated errands. The efficiency effect could show itself as an expansion in 
the interest for work in similar areas experiencing robotization or as an expansion 
in the interest for work in nonautomating divisions.
Second, according to Acemoglu et al. [12], “capital aggregation” activated by 
expanded mechanization (which raises the interest for capital) will likewise raise 
the interest for work. Third, mechanization does not simply work at the broad 
edge—supplanting undertakings recently performed by work—yet at the escalated 
edge also, expanding the efficiency of machines in assignments that were recently 
robotized. This marvel, which we allude to as “deepening of automation,” makes an 
efficiency effect however no uprooting, and along these lines builds work request. 
Despite the fact that these countervailing impacts are significant, they are for the 
most part deficient to incite a “balanced growth path,” implying that regardless 
of whether these effects were incredible, continuous computerization would at 
present lessen the offer of work in national income (and potentially employment). 
Acemoglu et al. [12] contend that there is an all the more remarkable countervailing 
power that expands the interest for work just as the portion of work in national 
income: the formation of new undertakings, capacities, and exercises in which work 
has a near preferred position relative to machines. The production of new errands 
creates a restoration effect straightforwardly counterbalancing the displacement 
effect [12].
Sachs et al. [33] expect in their study that robots are not to help people in the 
study, however to supplant them totally. They concluded that the presentation of 
robots will help profitability in the short term, yet decline wages and utilization 
over the long haul. Sachs and Kotlikoff [27], expecting that “brilliant machines” 
supplant youthful and untalented yet favor old and talented work, locate that lone 
a generational arrangement can make the presentation of robots a gainful situation 
for the two ages. So also, Sachs et al. [33] contend for government redistribution 
in this situation to counter the “immiserization” of people in the future. Autor 
[34] reacts to these alerts by expressing that in these models “the key danger isn’t 
innovation essentially yet misgovernance”: it is not an issue of shortage of employ-
ments, but instead a distributional issue that robots undoubtedly make human 
work pointless. He contends that a fitting capital duty can assist with gaining 
innovative ground a government assistance improving procedure for all gatherings 
of laborers [27, 28, 34].
Robotization and advanced innovations all the more for the most part will 
empower little players, including people and little organizations, to attempt venture 
work that is currently before were done inside greater firms. The development of 
little and extremely enormous organizations could make a barbell-shaped economy, 
in which middle-sized organizations could miss out. It is not yet clear whether 
computerization could elevate rivalry, empowering firms to enter new zones 
outside their past center organizations and making a developing separation between 
mechanical pioneers and loafers in each area [35].
The skill premia (the general pay of high-talented specialists to low-gifted 
laborers) rise up the majority of the second 50% of the only remaining century, 
regardless of huge increments in the gracefully of high-gifted laborers. The end 
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was that there more likely than not been something like an SBTC which expanded 
the interest for high-talented laborers considerably more. Berman et al. [17] were 
among the frontier to examine the wellsprings of the consistently expanding skill 
premia. In a comparative vein, Krusell et al. [25] modeled an economy with an 
interdependent between a sort of capital and high-talented laborers. The kind of 
capital they have at the top of the priority list is Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) capital. Krusell et al. [25] report that the cost of ICT capital has 
been falling for quite a long while. In this way, such a capital-ability interdepen-
dency, a fall in the cost of ICT capital will prompt an expanded reception in firms 
and consequently to an expanded interest for high-talented specialists to work 
these machines. Michaels et al. [26] affirm these discoveries with more up to date 
information: Sectors with higher development in ICT likewise had higher incre-
ments in the interest for high-gifted specialists and diminishes in the interest for 
center talented laborers. Spitz-Oener [36] secures that position necessities have 
been expanding in a similar time, for example, the extent of complex undertakings 
has been expanding. These adjustments in the assignment structure have addi-
tionally raised the interest for aptitudes in the labor market [25].
Dao et al. [19] discover that industrial sectors which had some expertise in 
routine exercises would in general experience bigger abatements in the labor share. 
Graetz and Michaels [22] use open data on robot use to measure the effects on labor 
profitability development, absolute factor productivity development, unit costs, 
and employment. Their disclosures show that robots increment labor efficiency 
development and all out profitability development however will in general reduce 
output price. While there is by all accounts no impact of robots use and complete 
business, they locate a negative effect of robots on the work portion of low-gifted 
specialists [22, 37].
In another investigation, Acemoglu and Restrepo [11] center around US nearby 
work markets. They join information from EU KLEMS and robot use to follow the 
impacts of expanded presentation to robots on neighborhood work markets from 
1970 to 2007. As Graetz and Michaels [22], they find that the appropriation of 
robots prompts enormous and strong decreases in work and wages [38].
The movement of AI task substitution from lower to higher intellect (mechanical, 
scientific, instinctive, and sympathetic) brings about unsurprising movements after 
some time. As indicated by this view, scientific abilities will turn out to be less signifi-
cant, as AI assumes control over progressively expository errands, giving the “milder” 
natural and sympathetic aptitudes considerably more significance for administration 
representatives. In the end, AI will be equipped for performing even the instinctive 
and compassionate undertakings, which empowers imaginative methods of human-
machine incorporation for offering support yet in addition brings about a key risk for 
human employment [24, 39].
Other than work replacement, the innovative change is relied upon to influence 
the structure of employment much more than the degree of employment, some-
thing that would make a more polarized labor market between profoundly qualified 
and low-gifted occupations. An outcome, there would be progressively huge pay 
imbalances between the two posts.
A primary challenge for the eventual fate of work is related to adapting to rising 
disparity, as innovative change will generate the victors and failures and an expan-
sion of the working poor [5, 21]. The some of studies concludes that innovation 
might be the single biggest supporter of the expansion in disparity of salary. This 
emerges on the grounds that organizations embrace advances at an alternate pace 
and have varying degrees of accomplishment with their AI and automated changes. 
Simultaneously, the robotization of laborers’ exercises for capital drives down the 
work portion of pay [7, 35].
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Until then some studies from pessimistic view are mentioned, but there are some 
other studies believe that robotization and employment can be complimentary. The 
optimistic studies are listed below:
For example, Autor [34] identify in his study that the automation has not clear 
out a most of jobs instead, automation will substitute for labor—as it is typically 
intended to do. But, automation will also complement labor, increases output 
that create higher demand for labor, and responds to changes in labor supply. He 
believes that some studies lean to overestimate the context of robot backup for 
labor and forget the robust complementarities between robotization and labor that 
rise productivity, increase earnings, and boost demand for labor. Autor [34] also 
argue in his study that the polarization is doubtful to go very far into the anticipated 
future. Arntz et al. [40] demonstrates that these pessimistic scenarios are exag-
gerating the portion of automatable jobs by ignoring the massive diversity of tasks 
within jobs as well as the versatility of jobs in the digital transformation. In order to 
support their proposal, they used detailed task data and declared that, when taking 
into accounting the spectrum of tasks within jobs, the robotization risk of US jobs 
decrease from 38 to 9%. Earlier studies have produced by Doms et al. concluded 
that based on the skill-biased nature of ICT that indicate skilled labor and ICT are 
complementary [43].
Autor and Salomons [41] has also concluded that systematic view of four 
different channels of how robotization may affect the employee market; own-
industry effects, between-industry, cross-country effects, and final demand 
effects. They stated that total factor productivity has negative direct effects 
on employment but positive indirect effects. In summary, the positive effects 
dominate and the long term outcome of robotization on employment is positive. 
They studied 24 OECD economies and stated that while displacing employment 
in the industries where it originates, automation generates indirect employment 
Robotization effects on 
employment
Studies Dimensions/ideas
Autor [34] The automation and labor are highly complementary
Arntz et al. [40] Automation is hard to adapt/massive diversity of tasks/adaptability of 
jobs in the digital transformation
Autor and Salomons [41] Own-industry, between-industry, cross-country, and final demand 
effects
Bresnahan et al. [42] Skilled labor is complementary with a cluster of three distinct changes 
at the firm level: information technology, new work organization, and 
new products and services.
Doms et al. [43] Skilled labor and ICT are complementary
Kurzweil [44] Improvements in technology will yield greater opportunities
Mokyr et al. [45] Innovations will result in unimaginable new occupations
Negroponte [46] Borderless new era
Song [47] Technology, will rid markets of inefficiency and propel humanity 
toward its fullest potential
Wolter et al. [31] The Economy 4.0 scenario will create 1.5 million new jobs which will 
not exist




growth in customer industries and rise in aggregate demand, finally bringing net 
employment growth [41].
Another optimistic study is made by Bresnahan et al. [42]; their study concluded 
that the competent labor is complementary with a group of three separate changes 
at the company level: information technology, new work organization, and new 
products and services.
In labor economics field, replacement of human work by AI and robots is 
fervently talked about. In any case, as indicated by Autor , robotization and 
mechanical advancement has not prompted the oldness of human work. Indeed, 
computerization and labor are exceptionally correlative and are partial to represen-
tatives that are versatile, ingenious, and arrangements situated [34].
Taking into account the former practices learned since the Industrial Revolution, 
Mokyr et al. argue that PCs and robots will make anew things and organizations 
and that these thing progressions will achieve impossible new occupations [45, 49].
3. Potential economic results of robotization and offered welfare models
The financial change following quick robotization can be more difficult than 
the procedure we have illustrated for various reasons. Generally clear, robotization 
changes the idea of existing jobs, and the reallocation of laborers from existing 
employments and undertakings to new ones is a complex and frequently slow pro-
cedure. It requires some investment for laborers to find new openings and errands 
in which they can be profitable, and periods during which laborers are laid off from 
their current occupations can make a discouraged local or national labor market, 
further expanding the expenses of modification.
These impacts are noticeable in ongoing examinations that have concentrated 
on the change of nearby US work markets to negative interest stuns, for example, 
Autor [15], who study the moderate and exceptionally inadequate change of local 
labor markets in light of the flood in Chinese exports, Mian and Sufi [50], who 
explore the ramifications of the breakdown in housing costs on consumption and 
local employment. Acemoglu and Restrepo [11], who discover work furthermore, 
wage decreases in territories generally presented to one specific sort of computer-
ization, the presentation of modern robots in assembling. The chronicled record 
additionally underscores the agonizing idea of the alteration.
The fast presentation of new advancements during the British Industrial 
Revolution eventually prompted rising work request and wages; however this was 
simply after an extended time of stale wages, growing destitution, and furthermore, 
unforgiving day to day environments. During an 80-year time frame reaching out 
from the start of the Industrial Revolution to the center of the nineteenth century, 
compensation deteriorated and the work share fell, even as innovative advances and 
efficiency development were progressing in the British economy, a wonder which 
Allen [51] names the “Engel’s delay.” There should in this manner be no assumption 
that the acclimation to the changed work advertise realized by fast computerization 
will be a consistent, costless, also, quick procedure. It is maybe telling that wages 
began developing in the nineteenth-century British economy simply after mass 
tutoring and different interests in human capital extended the aptitudes of the 
workforce.
So also, the acclimation to the huge flexibly of work liberated from agribusiness 
in mid twentieth-century. America may have been enormously supported by the 
“secondary school development,” which expanded the human capital of the new 
age of American laborers [52]. The powers at work here are probably going to be 
progressively broad than these models. New errands will in general require new 
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abilities. Be that as it may, to the degree that the workforce does not have those 
abilities, the change procedure will be hampered. Considerably more forebodingly, 
if the instructive framework is not doing giving those abilities (and in the event that 
we are not in any case mindful of the kinds of new aptitudes that will be required to 
empower interests in them), the change will be significantly hindered [12].
As for example, demographer Joel Kotkin [53] causes to notice the advancement 
toward neo-feudalism in California. The Golden State, with a populace of 38 million 
occupants, has regularly been viewed as a model of a “mesocratic culture” in the US 
with an extremely enormous white collar class. As indicated by late turns of events, 
four separated classes have been developed: (a) the theocracy of the super-rich, par-
ticularly in fund and IT; the scholarly world class, like academics, (b) media experts 
or public decision-makers; (c) the white collar class of experts and little owners; 
and (d) the serfs, spoke to by the “working needy individuals” and those subject to 
endowments and government help.
As indicated by the discoveries of Kotkin, the once adequate white collar class 
has been damaged and California has gone into a neo-primitive period, while the 
oligarchs and the scholarly elites has increased more force and the servants has 
duplicated all over the place.
In future where respectable and generously compensated occupations for 
everybody are vulnerable to be rebuilt with the increase of robotization, in such a 
situation, the best option for the government assistance states to counterbalance 
laborers’ vulnerability is to invigorate “minimum income guarantees” so as to com-
pose social citizenship compelling. This is by all accounts a conceivable strategy in 
develop European government assistance declare that as they have just encountered 
a panoply of “safety net” arrangements of social security for the workless [54, 55].
In periods of economic shrink, around the 1930s, and between 1970s and early 
1980s, Basic Income discussions are higher than in periods of economic growth (for 
example, growth of capitalism in the 1950 and 1960s) [56].
What is a UBI? The discussion on a UBI is frequently riotous and without exact 
definitional forms. In numerous occurrences, a UBI is compared with ensured least 
pay plans, while others characterize a widespread program as one that does not 
build up any qualification models other than age. We propose a meaning of UBI 
dependent on three center structure decisions—that it is paid to all, unequivocally, 
and in cash.
Giving salary backing to jobless residents has been a long-standing duty in 
government assistance majority rule governments since the occasions were projects 
to battle the old social hazard, for example, joblessness were executed. The con-
ventional presumption of such approaches was that, after a period had slipped by 
in looking through a new position, the laborer may turn into an active employee 
again. This procedure of work modification shows up not to act naturally apparent 
any longer. As a result of occupation replacement actuated by robotization, con-
versation about giving cash backing to “replaced” laborers is picking up force in the 
public eye. However, the thought is to increase transversal social accord.
Scholar holding differing ideological thinking caution about the conceivable 
broken impacts that giving cash without working could create. After all, entrance 
to work as the methods for social incorporation is the choice favored by a dominant 
part of the individuals in (post) modern social orders. Research and studies exhibit 
that giving money installments to the least fortunate improves their lives and does 
not increment inefficient spending or apathy [57, 58].
An another aspect of robotization effect on economy and social orders as well. 
The robotization effect on “personal economy” is examined by Kencebay [4]. It is 
stated that Anxiety has higher and quite material effect on Personal Economy. The 
study anticipated that Personal Economy will have stronger effect on “Intention to 
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Accept for Robots” [4]. The high unemployment rates and declining wages may rise 
the anxiety, due to the anxiety’s material effect on personal economy parallel to that 
it may effect the level of acceptance of robots. The acceptance of robot for capital 
owners and work force can be very different due to the separate and different incen-
tives, the potential controversy is clear but has not answered or studied yet.
Wispelaere et al. concluded that three crucial barriers that may block a basic 
income concept from providing the desired worldwide scope, the first barrier is 
obtaining a population-wide eligible applicant ensuring adaptation; the second 
barrier is instituting robust method of payment that arrive all aimed recipients; and 
the third barriers is creating an adequate control system in a policy framework [59].
A UBI is frequently connected with being a distinct advantage in power 
redistribution [60]. Such calls may reverberate and intensify previous impression 
of injustice and imbalances that are crawling into the establishments of implicit 
understandings [61, 62].
With regards to UBI, the models that are all inclusive and adequate are prob-
ably not going to be reasonable, and models that are moderate are not general. The 
International Labor Organization gauges the worldwide normal expense for UBI, 
as an extent of total national output, would be 32.7%. Current worldwide normal 
government use is 33.5% of GDP [57].
The distribution of revenues may not really be inspired by productivity 
improvements, however, by social and natural standards. From a social point of 
view, the thought is to reinforce the social texture by inciting a feeling of regular 
reason, which continues from characteristic assets being a type of investor profit for 
residents. Current models in Alaska and the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Nation 
typify this methodology [63]. The Alaska Permanent Fund is intended to distribute 
oil credit to occupants, while the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Nation is identified 
with gambling club benefits: since 1997, the innate government has given a segment 
of its profits to 16,000 grown-up ancestral individuals. The normal yearly profit is 
around US$4000 per capita, which is dependent upon government tax assessment 
and split into two installments for every year.
When it comes to the welfare models and unemployment solution, UBI or GMI 
have been studied besides other than no nation as of now has such a plan set up, 
and just two have done so incidentally (Mongolia and the Islamic Republic of Iran). 
Those encounters offer some accommodating bits of knowledge into center inqui-
ries, for example, financing and inflation, while test cases programs are producing 
data on at least one characterizing highlights of a UBI. However, framework wide 
issues are to a great extent left unanswered, for example, the relationship to the low-
est pay permitted by law, severance pay, or benefits [61]. Absolutely, for governors 
a adopt of robotization could come with raise aptitudes and advance employment 
creation. By reconsidering salary backing and social security nets, new government 
assistance plans are additionally to be modified [8, 64–66].
The concept of UBI has been studied by country based; ranging from the US 
[67], to Australia [68], to New Zealand [69], to Sweden [70], to the UK [71], to 
Belgium and the Netherlands, to Finland [72], and to the rest of Europe [73]. All 
studies’ main conclusion is that UBI may be applicable in these areas of authority, 
but that operation demands both strong and sustainable capital and political disci-
pline. In the following part, we will look at the basic income trails in history [74].
4. Basic income in history
In 1967, the territory of Alaska encountered an unexpected benefit of oil riches 
when North America’s biggest oil hold was found on state-claimed land. The rent 
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sold for a faltering US$900 million. Driven by Governor Jay Hammond, a 1976 
change to the legislation enforced the state to store in any event 25% of every 
year’s normal asset incomes in an Alaska Permanent Fund. The reserve incomes 
are put resources into an investment account, with part of the premium paid 
every year to occupants as an asset profit. Since 1982, each inhabitant has been 
qualified for a yearly UCT from the state. People must apply every year, meet the 
residency standards (be available in Alaska for the former year, with the expecta-
tion to remain uncertainly), and have no ongoing genuine criminal conviction. In 
excess of 90% of the populace regularly gets the profit. Not at all like a genuine 
UBI, the sum is neither stable nor adequate to address essential issues. The all out 
profit dissemination has truly added up to half of the reserve’s yearly premium 
(found the middle value of over the past five-year time frame); however, this 
was as of late decreased to distribute a greater amount of the store’s income to the 
state’s enormous shortfall.
The Alaska Permanent Fund profit has pulled in huge encouragement across 
segment, financial, and political partitions. The program has brought neediness 
and imbalance levels down to among the country’s most minimal and invigorated 
the economy, creating more than 7000 occupations and US$1.1 billion personal 
revenue, without inflation or decreasing work. Indeed, ongoing proof shows part-
time work has expanded by 17% [75]. Meantime the profit may have not influenced 
fertility ratios, it has gone about as a gentle magnet for at any rate 12,000 transients.
The Iranian UBI plot was conceived out of more extensive change bundles. In 
2008, the legislature reported a lot of clearing changes in energy and food aids. 
Nonetheless, opposite general belief to imply testing was developing. Subsequently, 
the focusing on plan was deserted, supplanted rather with uniform widespread 
money moves with the rich being debilitated from taking an interest. In January 
2010, Parliament affirmed the appropriation change bundle and arrangements were 
propelled to broadcast the changes, set up the bank framework, guarantee general 
record get to, and diminish swelling in front of the cost expands [76]. On December 
19, 2010, the universal cash move was saved in the financial balances of family 
heads. Simultaneously, local energy and agricultural costs rose by up to multiple 
times. From the outset, just 80% of families enlisted for the plan, an offer that 
immediately rose to 96%.
The amount of monthly cash transfer was set at Rls 455,000 (US$40–US$45) 
per individual—29% of median per capita income, and about multiple times the 
sum visualized in the endowment change law. The program assimilates about 3% 
of GDP. The blend of endowment changes and endorses activated swelling rates 
that disintegrated the exchanges’ buying power by 66% of their unique incentive 
by 2018. All things being equal, the program achieved promising outcomes. For 
instance, observational examinations discover by and large no negative work grace-
fully impact (on hours worked and investment); yet the young worked somewhat 
less (for the most part since they were joining up with advanced education), while 
administration laborers worked increasingly [76].
At the automatic level, the decision would rely upon the announcement of the 
issue that UBI is planned to address—for instance, regardless of whether innovative 
advances will in the long run bring about gigantic net occupation misfortunes—and 
how well frameworks or a specific program are neutralizing that objective in a given 
setting [77]. Evaluating the propriety and practicality of UBI requires understand-
ing and working; however, the exchange offs that any program or set of projects 
face as far as inclusion, progressivity, sufficiency, motivators, costs, financing 
choices, political economy, and conveyance. None of these parameters have a simple 
and prearranged result [78, 79]. A UBI is an apparently straightforward thought 




SEO specialist, social media account representative, Uber driver, Airbnb host, 
influencer, app developer, and drone operator; these jobs were not exist 10 years 
ago. Can we image today’s 5-year-olds do when they are 25? What kind of jobs will 
disappear, will robotization create new jobs that compensate the job loss? How 
employment will be affected by robotization? Which welfare model in this new era 
would be appropriate? Will UBI or GMI be paid? Will UBI or GMI solve the problem 
of potential unemployment? Have governments’ convenient economic structure to 
pay these fees for long term? What is the global reality and testimony around UBI?
While computerization has verifiably been connected to routine errands includ-
ing predetermined, regulated actions, and big data method are currently quickly 
entering regions that can supplant work in a wide assortment of non-routine 
subjective undertakings. What’s more, exceptional robots increase propelled sense 
and finesse, permitting them to play out a more extensive manual errand region. 
This is probably going to change the idea of work among industries and professions.
The mankind has been fearing its economic redundancy for long time. Robots 
and automation are instilling that same fear in leading academics and concerned 
politicians alike. Some of the official reports or bestseller books may be predicting 
a dark future. Machines are anticipated to be increasingly taking over tasks cur-
rently executed by humans. An permanent job crisis will be inevitable for virtually 
everyone except the best brains. That’s what was announced… in the early 60s. 
Pessimists believe that artificial intelligence and robotics will eventually turn most 
of the working population idle. Computers can make medical diagnoses, deliver 
legal documents, translate texts, teach students, control planes, presenting care 
provision, the transport and distribution sector, freight handling, and what is left of 
industrial production with a new wave of automation. The catastrophe is very close. 
New welfare systems have to be planned or new political views even capitalism may 
be fall. Optimists believe that robotization may change the welfare system and job 
market but pace of robotization and new job opportunities may not create dark 
scenarios.
Supplanting innovations supplant laborers and may cause joblessness. As 
opposed to the standard system dependent on empowering advances, supplanting 
innovations can lessen wages. It may cause polarization of employment. Truth be 
told, employment development can regularly be in zones where wage development 
is restricted. There is discussion between who feel that we have come up short on 
thoughts and who imagine that we are at the edge of making endless thriving with 
PCs creating PCs delivering robots delivering computers. Those who stress over the 
troublesome impacts of AI and robots, we despite need a lot of proof, yet a por-
tion of the examples we have seen demonstrate there will be a ton of disturbance. 
As optimistic scenario’s main assumption that as new machines supplant work 
in certain undertakings may happen, and new assignments in which work has 
comparative improvement will be made but it seems that optimistic and pessimist 
scenarios have one common thing; routine tasks conducted by low-skill employees 
probably face with job extinction. Education system and job structure have to be 
changed in order to keep pace with high speed technological changes. People’s skill 
needs would be changed, the employees who are open to learn and change would be 
the survival of this race. Governments has a huge responsibility to maintain social 
equity without disturb the economic balances.
The investigation of the referenced above scientific works gives the motivation 
to accept that the likely ramifications for business and the social circle related with 
maturing of a few and the presence of new callings are still hard to be predictable. 
From one viewpoint, the fast and difficulty procedure of robotization shows that 
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neither relevant education nor creating of new abilities in future will save from 
unemployment, the material risk, and threat in the labor market. On the other 
hand, the mechanisms of employment transformation has to be considered, the 
appearance of jobs in new industries, the probable introduction of technological, 
financial, legal, and other restrictions on automation and robotization of jobs.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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